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Introduction 
At around midnight on the 11th March 1864 the Dale Dyke Reservoir (DDR), eight 
miles north-west of the thriving industrial town of Sheffield in South Yorkshire, 
England, burst its banks and sent 650 million gallons of water, or 40,000 cubic feet 
per second, cascading down the valley at eighteen miles per hour. The flood waters 
followed the route of the river Loxley before joining with the river Don, smashing 
through everything in their course into Sheffield: corn and paper mills and their stocks, 
steel and machine tools manufactories, mill-dams, bridges, livestock, housing and 
their sleeping inhabitants were swept away. Trees were uprooted and rocks torn up. 
The villages of Low Bradfield, Damflask and Little Matlock, as well as Malin Bridge, 
Owlerton and Hillsborough, all part of suburban Sheffield, were flooded. Once the 
waters reached town, gardens, yards and cellars were submerged, reaching nine feet in 
places; in the morning Sheffield was left ‘covered thick with timber, stones, sand, and 
mud.’2 According to the official figures, 250 lives were lost, though a local historian 
has since calculated the death toll, including deaths through debilitating illnesses 
caused by deep water immersion, at 306.3 
 The reservoir, having just been completed to supply compensation water to 
millowners, was the property of the Sheffield Water Works Company. The Company 
owned another three reservoirs in neighbouring valleys, as well as a service reservoir 
in town, and hired a resident engineer to manage the works, as well as a consultant 
engineer who designed and supervised their construction. The flood attracted 
considerable interest from provincial and national newspapers, and sparked anxieties 
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about the public safety of large socio-technological ventures as well as the expertise 
of civil engineers. Unsurprisingly, the Company’s directors and engineers defended 
the flood as an unanticipated accident caused by a land slippage in the valley. For 
others, including the Sheffield Town Council, as well as a vocal minority of 
internationally-recognised engineers, the avoidable flood was the result of poor 
workmanship. Corners were cut during construction, problems were identified but not 
rectified, and the design specifications were fatally flawed. Whilst engineering 
disputes were not unheard of, it was rare for one group to publicly blame their 
colleagues for engineering failures. However, R.A. Buchanan and others have shown 
that the Victorian engineering profession was increasingly subject to various social, 
political and cultural divisions, which led to institutional proliferation and served to 
generate a multiplicity of voices and opinions on major engineering failures like the 
Sheffield (1864) and Holmfirth (1852) floods and the collapse of the Tay Bridge 
outside Dundee (1879).4 
Having been described as ‘the greatest single “natural” catastrophe of the 
[nineteenth-] century’ in Britain, an examination of the Sheffield flood highlights the 
contested nature of disaster investigation.5 This was particularly pertinent in cases 
where engineers and other ‘disaster experts’ (as Scott Gabriel Knowles refers to those 
insurance officials, government inspectors and researchers who built careers on 
studying and acquiring knowledge about disasters) disagreed over the causes of socio-
technological failure – as was often the case with large urban fires, collapsed bridges, 
coastal floods and so on – where there existed no straightforward explanation.6 
Victorian engineers, whilst claiming to possess the tools to tame nature for man’s 
benefit, also adroitly disputed their level of control over the natural environment 
whenever it mattered. Engineers were one of a growing number of elites whose 
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professional practices and experience were contingent on their access to, and 
understanding of, an evolving body of scientific and technical knowledge about how 
best to harness nature to man’s control, as well as their confidence and freedom in 
being able to utilize new technological structures and materials in their works. This 
has been further borne out in recent research, including a special issue in this journal, 
which has revealed how modern Western understandings of risk and uncertainty are 
inextricably linked, and that disasters are taken as unfortunate consequences of 
societal and technological modernization, rather than the product of natural forces or 
acts of God.7 Since professional engineering was founded on an element of risk-
taking, engineered landscapes were always subject to uncertainty and failure, and 
there is little natural about these “engineering-induced disasters”.8 
Drawing on a burgeoning historiography at the intersection of the histories of 
technology and the environment, this paper will illustrate the interdependence of 
socio-technological systems and engineering knowledge with the political agendas of 
municipal governments and private water suppliers. Histories of technology share 
common ground with urban environmental history because of the way that ‘nature and 
technology – and the way in which we understand the two – have become more and 
more entangled, blurring boundaries that once seemed so clear.’ This is because ‘a 
city is both an environment and a network of technological systems’, which blurs the 
boundaries between what is traditionally seen as “natural” (non-human) and 
“artificial” (human and cultural) environments.9 In his study of the evolution of the 
modern Spanish waterscape, Eric Swyngedouw persuasively argues that ‘[h]ardly any 
river basin, hydrological cycle, or water flow has not been subjected to some form of 
human intervention or use; not a single form of social change can be understood 
without simultaneously addressing and understanding the transformations of and in 
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the hydrological process.’10 It is, therefore, plausible to view “engineering-induced 
disasters” as the product of ‘a network of interwoven processes that are 
simultaneously human, natural, material, cultural, mechanical, and organic.’11 By 
problematising this ‘nature/built environment nexus’, one can trace the interactions 
between human technologies and urban political cultures.12 
As an example of a socio-technological system, which connected the natural 
and urban environments into a new kind of liminal space, the DDR’s failure 
reverberated politically as much as it had an environmental and social impact locally. 
It violently shook the Victorian belief in the beneficial relationship between 
technological innovation and environmental justice, and provided a ‘window of 
opportunity’ through which local actors attempted to better regulate and manage the 
supply of water for industrial and residential consumption. Clare Johnson et al and 
Thomas Birkland have shown how city-based floods and other similar “nature-
induced” events act as catalysts for policy change by placing hazard management and 
prevention onto the political agenda, thereby making technology, engineering and the 
natural environment matters for state involvement.13 Learning from disaster takes 
place across three main stages, from the emergency phase through to the recovery and 
reconstruction phases, and involves a variety of groups, including engineers, 
legislators, service providers, and insurers, as well as local communities affected on 
the ground.14 Yet lessons themselves are contested by interested parties, and, although 
policy windows elevate a problem to public attention, it does not automatically 
translate that those parties will act positively. Nor, as we shall see, does the window 
remain open for long or guarantee significant change beyond a return to the status quo. 
Lessons can be disputed, repudiated, forgotten, unlearned or even simply ignored.15 
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A Going Concern 
Sheffield Water Works Company was incorporated in 1830 with clear expansionist 
aims. In 1830 and 1845, the Company secured Acts of Parliament to expand its 
service by constructing a series of impounding and compensation reservoirs in the 
Redmires and Rivelin valleys. These ‘protosystems’, as Martin Melosi refers to early 
urban-industrial waterworks, were completed by 1854 to increase the Company’s 
control over the town’s infrastructure, as well as to improve the health of its 
customers. They did so by supplying an estimated 2.8 million gallons of water daily to 
the town in addition to 1.5 million gallons as compensation to the millowners on the 
rivers.16 
In its ongoing search for improved potable water, the Company established 
ever larger ‘ecological frontiers’ for the town.17 Water was increasingly seen in terms 
of how it could service urban populations, that is, as a resource ‘essential for urban 
and demographic growth.’18 As Joel Tarr puts it, water was a pivotal feature of the 
industrial city’s metabolism, providing energy and potable water required by urban 
populations.19 The preamble to the Company’s 1830 Act reads that the rapid growth 
in Sheffield’s population had left the town ‘very inadequately supplied with water’ to 
furnish the ‘health, comfort, convenience and security’ to its inhabitants, while its 
1854 Act viewed water as a resource ‘to be taken and diverted’ into reservoirs. What 
the Company’s directors, all Sheffield men, wanted was a ‘regular and ample supply 
of pure and wholesome water.’ Only then could they furnish the town with that 
‘bright, and colourless Water’ which its customers demanded.20 Once impounded, 
water could then be assigned a use. Usage inevitably inscribed water with new 
meanings and a monetary valuation, which helped transform the ‘protosystem’ into a 
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serviceable infrastructure, but also inevitably exacerbated existing social and 
environmental inequalities between suppliers and consumers.21 
This tension between nature, technology and the built environment inevitably 
brought water suppliers into contact with socio-technological experts.22 Sheffield’s 
directors plugged into an expanding network of professional engineers in their drive 
to continually expand their waterworks system, and drew their technological 
inspiration from early canal and railway initiatives. Leeds-based engineer John 
Towlerton Leather was appointed as Managing Clerk, Resident Agent and Surveyor 
in 1830, shortly after starting his Sheffield practice, with responsibility for designing 
and building the works. He had served his apprenticeship with his uncle, George 
Leather, building the Goole Docks in the East Riding for the Aire and Calder 
Navigation. When he became Consulting Engineer in 1839, in order to expand his 
external practice, he was succeeded in residence by John Gunson, a lifelong Company 
employee.23 
The Company also consulted with other leading engineers between the 1830s 
and ‘50s, including John Frederic La Trobe Bateman, engineer to Manchester 
Waterworks, and James Simpson, who was engineer to Chelsea Waterworks.24 
Having served his apprenticeship on the canals, Bateman’s reputation was forged 
during an illustrious career in reservoir construction, notably Manchester 
Corporation’s waterworks at Longdendale (1848-77) and its controversial Lake 
District scheme. He was also engaged with over thirty other urban waterworks 
systems and was a lifelong member of the Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE), 
including its President in 1878-79.25 Simpson, meanwhile, spent most of his career 
working for the Chelsea and Lambeth water companies, where he designed and 
installed water filter beds, before turning his attention to gravitational engineering at 
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Bristol, Aberdeen and Liverpool. He too was President of the ICE, in 1854-55, which 
illustrates the high regard that water engineers were held in the engineering profession 
and was, as Christine MacLeod has convincingly elided, part of a wider celebration of 
heroic invention as engineers tamed nature and became the standard-bearers of the 
industrial classes.26 
In addition to externally validating the Company’s works, consultation 
inevitably brought uniformity in reservoir design during the nineteenth-century. In 
most cases, a trench was dug across the end of the valley to be closed, and a wall of 
puddled earthen clay (clay mixed with sand, wetted and kneaded into a water-tight 
amalgam) sunk down to bed-rock and raised in thin layers from its foundation, to 
settle and harden into a solid barrier against water leakage. A slope of earth was added 
on each side to further protect the puddle. The dam’s water faces were then covered 
with masonry and sown with grass to give a natural appearance, thereby further 
blurring the boundaries between “natural” and “artificial” landscapes. By 1840 there 
were around a dozen such engineered landscapes in Britain, the majority around 
Yorkshire and Lancashire, as well as the Scottish Lowlands. British engineers 
preferred this mode of construction simply because it had proven itself to be 
successful over time, in canal and railway embankments as well as waterworks 
technology, and they subsequently attempted, with varied success, to build similar 
systems across the British Empire. Yet, as Harold Platt has argued, this method was 
largely dependent on a working experience of on-site problems and the collation of 
reliable data on rainfall and surface water run-off to better plan for changing seasonal 
conditions.27 
Sheffield’s continued urbanisation during the Company’s formative years saw 
residential demand for water continue to rise. During the 1850s, the town experienced 
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‘a massive demographic surge’ (its population rising to 185,172 by 1861) to become 
the fifth largest in England, which was the result of a major expansion in steel 
production fuelled by a flood of in-migrant labour. The town expanded in a 
centrifugal pattern with a mushrooming of working-class terraced housing towards the 
north-east, while middle-class suburbs developed on the western and south-western 
fringe.28 This surge had major implications for the supply of water, especially through 
the increased pressures on domestic water practices involving cooking, flushing and 
cleansing. In 1848, there were only 126 indoor water closets in the town. Within five 
years, the Company had imposed charges on their spiraling use. Similar rates were 
introduced for bath-tubs, which led to a protracted legal dispute over the Company’s 
rights to charge additional costs for user technologies. In 1853 the Company supplied 
water to roughly eighty-five per cent of the town’s residents, and drew annual revenue 
of over £13,000. Between 1854 and 1861, the average rental increase from new 
customers was £852 per annum. During the same period, the Company laid over thirty 
miles of new pipes.29 
Extended supply technologies connected the Company’s water catchment and 
storage areas with the town’s growing number of outlets for consuming water, 
creating a vast socio-technological network. Thus, the technologies of service 
reservoirs, water pipes, mains and flushing systems played increasingly important 
roles in circulating water throughout the city and its hinterland. Such networks 
inevitably brought private water suppliers into conflict with public regulatory bodies, 
notably the Town Council’s Water-Works Committee, whose role, since its formation 
in late 1844, was to supervise the cleanliness of the water that was being privately 
provided to homes, rather than seek the role of supplier itself. The earliest municipal 
ethos was, therefore, regulatory in character.30 
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Supply difficulties were exacerbated by delayed land purchases, ongoing 
repairs, and a drought in 1852, which reduced the daily supply below the Company’s 
statutory guarantees and drew censure from the Water-Works Committee.31 
Engineering provided the solution when, in 1853, the Company secured parliamentary 
sanction for an expanded source of supply in the Loxley Valley, including powers to 
construct three new reservoirs, along with connecting aqueducts and tunnels to an 
enlarged storage reservoir.32 Loxley offered natural advantages over the Rivelin and 
Redmires valleys, but only after engineers had mastered gravitational delivery. As a 
steep and narrow millstone grit valley, water was naturally purified and softened by 
the grit before being transported along the Loxley into the Don. The three planned 
reservoirs offered a combined drainage area of 6,978 acres, almost one-and-a-half 
times greater than the existing watershed, and a capacity of 1,540 million gallons. 
Engineering practice would again harness the productive forces of nature by 
extending Sheffield’s hinterland and bringing the benefits of an expanded water 
supply to the town’s thirsty residents, thereby producing an expanded waterscape that, 
to paraphrase Swyngedouw, would weave together nature and society – through the 
various underground and surface pipes, mains, aqueducts, rivers, streams and their 
tributaries – to produce what he calls “socionature”.33 
By establishing nature as a serviceable resource for industrialising towns, 
contemporaries circumvented the tendency to delineate between natural and man-
made environments, preferring instead to identify town and countryside as mutually 
beneficial, ‘integral to each other’ with their own permanencies, particularly in a 
commercial and engineering sense.34 Dale Dyke was the first Loxley works to be built, 
in a ‘hammock of hills close to the picturesque village of Bradfield,’ where several 
small streams converged. Construction work began in January 1859 with a catch-
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water reservoir and artificial watercourse to intercept the waters during the building of 
the embankment, and was completed during the winter of 1863-64, whereupon it was 
gradually filled until its collapse. Its chief function was to impound the water 
produced within the gathering grounds to provide compensation to the mill-owners on 
the river, whilst the neighbouring Strines and Agden reservoirs (both completed in 
1869) would service public consumption. With a water area of 78 acres and a capacity 
of over 700 million gallons, the DDR was a monumental example of mid-Victorian 
water-works engineering designed to celebrate the Water Company’s mastery of its 
natural environment as well as to fuel future growth in water demand. Its embankment, 
at 1,254 feet long and 95 feet high, was above average in size to offset future 
expansion in the Company’s interests: its greatest width at the base was upwards of 
500 feet; while the puddle wall at the top was four feet thick, increasing to sixteen feet 
at ground level, and sunk to a depth of 60 feet below the sandstone surface to make it 
water-tight. Utilising nature’s own tools, the sloping walls of the embankment were 
composed of a mixture of shale and rubble excavated from the reservoir bed, 
techniques borrowed from the leading water engineers. To maintain river flow, twin 
18-inch cast-iron outlet pipes ran through the puddled clay trench in the base of the 
embankment and ended at the foot of the slope in a valve-house, while a bye-wash 
provided an outlet for overflow.35 
The construction process was beset with setbacks from the outset. Delays were 
occasioned by difficulties in excavating the puddle wall foundations, where leakages 
from springs in the sandstone bed were recurring problems. The artificial watercourse 
collapsed under flood waters in 1863, causing the main reservoir to fill fifty feet, 
which had to be emptied before construction could resume. As a precaution, Gunson 
moved the dam’s centre line upstream onto firmer ground to protect against further 
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disruptions.36 Such incidents caused little alarm, however, since, as the disaster 
studies literature confirms, failures to individual components are considered to be 
normal within a maturing industry.37 The growth of mechanical engineering – with 
the formation of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers (IME) in 1847 to rival the 
ICC, which had enjoyed a monopoly since its creation in 1818 – introduced new ways 
of thinking about urban problems. Coupled with increased specialisation in marine, 
structural and other engineering disciplines, each with their own institutional bodies, 
there emerged new knowledge, materials and approaches within the nascent field.38 
With professional diversification came competing, and invariably fluid, opinions, as 
well as evolving knowledge: Platt notes how plans for new water-works were rarely 
executed as intended and each new project became ‘a source of both on-the-job 
education in hydraulic engineering and influential advances in waterworks 
technology.’39 
Reservoir engineers were, however, conscious to protect themselves from 
blame since the failure of a dam could have devastating repercussions for their 
reputations. They also severely dented their Water Company’s revenue, particularly 
since, following the collapse of the Bilberry dam outside Holmfirth, West Yorkshire, 
in 1852, all water companies had to accept liability for losses caused by the failure of 
any reservoir embankment.40 John Towlerton Leather was more alert to this than 
others since his uncle had been consulting engineer at Bilberry. Problems had plagued 
this project from the outset: the contractors cut corners to complete on budget, and the 
reservoir, which leaked throughout the 1840s, was patently not water-tight.41 No-one 
was really surprised when it collapsed on the 5th February, 1852, releasing 300,000 
tons of water into the valley and desolating the manufacturing village of Holmfirth 
three miles below. Eighty-one people died, while over 6,000 workmen were thrown 
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out of employment. Following contradictory evidence at the Coroner’s inquest, 
George Leather’s reputation was left in tatters.42  
If the Holmfirth disaster was still fresh in the public mind during the early 
1860s, it brought no material benefits; nor did the policy window that emerged in its 
wake remain open for long. Indeed, the then home secretary, Sir George Grey (who 
coincidently happened to be back in office when the Sheffield flood occurred), had 
dismissed calls for state intervention, insisting that ‘the Government cannot undertake 
the inspection of all such Reservoirs at the public expence.’43 Notwithstanding the 
real anxieties felt by engineers about the safety of their works, Dale Dyke’s collapse 
came as a major surprise to John Gunson, who could do nothing to prevent a large 
crack in the outer wall of the embankment giving way in the early hours of the 11th 
March, 1864. 
An estimated 650 million gallons of water were sent rushing without warning 
down the narrow sloping valley, razing land, buildings, machinery and bridges and 
drowning hundreds of people and animals. Entire families were killed: Daniel 
Chapman, a young steel tilter and forger, his wife Ellen, their two sons, a domestic 
servant and two apprentice lodgers were drowned in their terraced house by the river 
at Little Matlock. James Trickett, a dairy farmer, died with his wife, Elizabeth, their 
three children and three servants at their home in Malin Bridge. George Bisby, 
innkeeper of the Cleakum public house at Malin Bridge, was also killed along with 
his family, leaving an orphaned daughter. The body of Bisby and his eldest daughter 
were found four days later in Sheffield. At Owlerton, a suburb to the north of 
Sheffield, the Loxley joins the river Don and here the waters changed course, running 
directly through Sheffield. The torrent was eventually halted by the river snaking into 
a north-easterly direction at Lady’s Bridge just outside the town centre, which 
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escaped damage. The densely populated area of the Wicker was inundated by the 
flood water instead. The flood waters even managed to reach Rotherham, some eleven 
miles east of Sheffield. Twenty bridges were either wholly or partially destroyed. 
Thirty-one factories, mills or workshops were destroyed, a further fifty-five were 
partially destroyed or damaged, while 237 were flooded. Some 800 houses were 
destroyed or abandoned and a further 4,357 flooded. Once the waters receded, they 
left an ‘accumulation of mud and decaying matter.’44 
The flood – which was immediately appropriated as a Sheffield event – 
elicited intense media interest. Newspapers sent journalists into the ‘wrecked and 
ruined district’ where they filed harrowing reports; the national dailies picked up the 
news through the telegraph wires operated by the editor of the Sheffield Telegraph, 
William Leng. Frequent editions of the two Sheffield dailies, the Telegraph (founded 
in 1855), which represented the predominantly Anglican and Conservative steel 
manufacturers, and the Sheffield and Rotherham Independent (founded in 1819), 
which was the mouthpiece for the Liberal guard, appeared throughout the day. Leng 
noted that his publishing office ‘was literally besieged throughout Saturday and we 
scarcely stopped our machines, the demand for news was insatiable. We were always 
bringing out new editions, and our steam machinery was kept going till close on 
midnight.’ The editor of the Independent, Robert Leader, reported that, although he 
had printed 80,000 copies of his paper on Saturday the 12th and Monday the 14th, 
‘many thousands of persons’ had been left disappointed, so he duly reprinted the 
detailed account in the Tuesday edition.45 
Intrigued by the fantastical details of the reports, crowds flocked to the scene. 
Special trains were laid on from many towns for up to two weeks after the flood. 
Newspaper reports described ‘an unceasing stream of visitors up the valley …, and 
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the scene of devastation, especially between Owlerton and Malin Bridge, was 
crowded for many hours.’46 In his account of the flood, which was based on published 
reports as well as survivor testimonies, the editor of the weekly-published The 
Sheffield Times, Samuel Harrison, estimated that 150,000 of the inhabitants of 
Sheffield visited the scene within days of the flood, while ‘perhaps an equal number 
came in from the adjacent villages and towns and from more distant parts.’ Many 
made it by foot as far as the ruined reservoir, effectively treating Bradfield as an 
extension of suburban Sheffield.47 
 
The Politics of Disaster Relief 
Even allowing for editorial bias – and Leng was an outspoken critic of the Water 
Company, which he felt represented the outdated Liberal elite – Sheffield’s 
newspapers fixed on two main narratives which emanated from the disaster. The first 
of these concerned the organised response to the flood, which drew Sheffield’s public 
bodies firmly into the events; the second dealt with the controversy surrounding the 
cause of the flood, which masked a wider dispute about the ownership of urban water 
supplies. Both narratives subsequently reappeared in national newspapers like The 
Times, which illustrates how disasters elicited an increasingly common response.48 
Responses to nature- and engineering-induced disasters were equally cultural and 
indicate a general willingness to draw practical lessons from such incidents as well as 
cope with catastrophe. Comparisons were even drawn between recent fires, 
explosions and floods, which illustrate a concerted interest in improved hazard 
management.49 
For once, it emerged that Sheffield’s civil bodies responded promptly in a 
crisis. Faced with a massive clear-up operation, public and private organisations alike 
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collaborated in an early instance of what would today be called joined-up government. 
Members of the police force, a municipal body usually subject to ridicule, were 
lauded for their ‘most arduous and praiseworthy’ exertions in working throughout the 
night to rescue residents from their submerged homes and remove dead bodies.50 The 
engines belonging to the various fire insurance offices worked day and night to pump 
out the town’s flooded cellars, while the Town Council’s Sanitary Committee, another 
vilified body, ordered a major clean-up of the town to prevent the spread of infection. 
Lime and chloride of lime were used to decontaminate streets and houses, while 
sewers were flushed out to avoid cross-contamination of water.51 
In the morning, the Mayor, Thomas Jessop, and Sheffield’s Chief Constable 
inspected the scene of devastation and promptly issued public notices requesting 
information of dead bodies found ‘so that they may be removed to the Sheffield 
Union House for Identification,’ and imploring the public to assist the police in 
recovering lost property.52 On the same day, the Town Clerk, John Yeomans, wrote to 
the Home Secretary requesting the attendance of a Government Inspector ‘to enquire 
into the Cause of this dreadful Catastrophe.’ The Borough Coroner issued a similar 
request the following day.53 Such examples of interactive readjustment, in which 
authority figures participated in information exchanges to accelerate readjustment, 
indicates an orderly and systematic response to coping with disaster and initiating 
recovery. It also illustrates how the co-ordination of emergency responses was 
conducted by municipal officers who had greater access to the resources necessary to 
aid recovery on a citywide basis without prejudice. The municipal official, according 
to Barry Doyle and others, was the exemplar of the Victorian transition into a 
professional and non-partisan approach towards urban governance, whereas private 
companies, with their responsibilities towards their shareholders, were not trusted to 
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act fairly in their treatment of such cases. Market failures merely exacerbated the 
existing social and environmental inequalities in water provision and the municipal 
authorities, in pursuing an emergency regulatory role, were better placed to offer help 
to everyone affected.54 
That the Water Company was not involved in recovery activity at any stage 
reveals both its unpreparedness to provide equal treatment to everyone and the 
tentative growing public faith in the quality of care offered by the town’s municipal 
regime, a recurring theme elsewhere.55 Sheffield’s ratepayers had little cause for 
optimism, however. For years, charges of inaction had been made against the Town 
Council, particularly its refusal to adopt the Public Health Act, 1848, on the grounds 
that it threatened ‘those principles of free local self-government, so congenial to the 
spirit and feelings of Englishmen.’56 The Council preferred to pursue its own course 
of toothless regulation; its Water-Works Committee had long tried to rein in, and 
failed, the Company’s expansionist schemes. Indeed, the threat of centralisation under 
the Chadwickian General Board of Health was tangible to a Council presiding over a 
town with an average life expectancy of twenty-four during the 1840s. A proposed 
improvement bill was twice defeated, in 1851 and 1858, through petty in-fighting 
between the Liberals and the radical Chartist-inspired Democrats.57 The Council only 
adopted the 1848 Act’s successor, the Local Government Office Act, in 1864 because 
it was a cheap option for implementing essential sanitary reforms.58 The Council was 
in the process of restructuring when the flood occurred and had recently urged the 
Company to provide a constant supply of water to the town.59 
Sheffield’s ratepayers were reluctant to engage with the political process 
during the mid nineteenth-century and it took systemic shocks to bring to their 
attention the extent of the inequalities in force in the town. They only accepted 
17 
incorporation in 1843 after a proposal that the West Riding magistracy, which sat 
outside Sheffield, should govern the town’s policing. Little changed in the town’s 
complex political landscape, however, since the Church Burgesses and Town Trustees, 
founded in 1554 and 1681 respectively, retained responsibility for the parish church, 
street improvements and hospitals, while the Cutlers Company, which was 
incorporated in 1624, controlled apprenticeship regulations and the award of 
corporate marks to cutlery manufacturers. Boards of highways surveyors and the 
police commissioners (formed in 1818) further muddied the political landscape. 
Manorial authority, vested with the Duke of Norfolk, continued over the town’s 
markets until the end of the century.60 
Sheffield’s political failures, particularly in its inability to limit the pecuniary 
interests of the Water Company, largely derived from the overlapping membership of 
the various bodies as well as in-fighting between the multiple interests. The 
Company’s Board of Directors was dominated from the outset by men who also 
served in public office. These included Samuel Hadfield, the two-time Master Cutler; 
Samuel Roberts, the silver plate manufacturer and town councillor; and the table knife 
manufacturer Thomas Asline Ward, who chaired many of the Company’s meetings 
during the 1830s and ‘40s alongside his other interests, which included the Town 
Trustees, the Sheffield Political Union and the Litt. and Phil. Society.61 Frederick 
Thorpe Mappin, the Managing Director of the file manufacturers Thomas Turton and 
Sons, was elected Master Cutler and town councillor in 1855, and became a director 
of the Water Company in 1862 and the Gas Company in 1863. Sheffield, therefore, is 
a classic example of contradictory interests and political inertia. The town’s Liberal 
elite was unwilling and incapable of regulating itself, not least since the town was 
governed by a bewildering patchwork of public authorities. 
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For all its problems, the flood posed an unanticipated window of opportunity 
for Sheffield’s urban elite – which, by the 1860s, was increasingly represented by 
Conservative steel-making interests who had emerged as the main challenge to 
Liberal control of the town62 – to establish the Town Council as more than an arms-
length regulator of the environment. In this it was ably assisted by Leng’s Telegraph, 
which pushed for a clearer demarcation of responsibilities between the municipal 
sphere and the marketplace. This was part of a broader transition, evident across the 
Western world, from overlapping and oligarchic public/private interests to a modern 
understanding of municipal governance that was openly democratic and 
accountable.63 Since the immediate task after collecting the dead was to provide 
shelter, food and drink and clothing for the hordes of homeless survivors, Jessop 
quickly convened a meeting, which was attended by the town’s leading manufacturers, 
at the Council Hall to discuss their coordinated response. Another meeting held the 
next day formally established the Sheffield Inundation Relief Committee (SIRC), 
which duly raised over £50,000 towards the relief effort.64 Although not strictly a 
municipal venture, the SIRC was placed under the management of the town’s public 
servants. Jessop, a senior partner in one of the town’s larger steel manufacturers and 
the presiding Master Cutler, was elected Treasurer, while Yeomans was appointed 
Honorary Secretary. Other members included the steel manufacturers Edward Vickers, 
Robert Jackson, John Brown and Robert Thomas Eaton, all of whom were either 
councillors or aldermen; Henry Vickers, who was Clerk to the Town Trustees; and 
Michael Ellison, the duke of Norfolk’s land agent. Post-disaster recovery was being 
viewed through a public lens, circumventing many of the traditional tensions between 
the established Liberal elite and the emerging Conservative steel manufacturers. 
Political rivalries were temporarily shelved as Sheffield’s political classes presented a 
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united front of resilience, which resonated with the fact that disasters historically 
reveal the resilience of urban governments, not least by allowing citizens the 
opportunity to observe how their political leaders respond to a crisis.65 Sheffield’s 
flood, therefore, marked the beginnings of a sustained shift towards municipal 
regulation; the market would no longer be left to regulate itself, while concerns about 
the safety of “socionature” prompted the introduction of new agencies responsible for 
supervisory control. 
 
Engineering Municipalisation 
Sheffield’s governing classes capitalised on the flood in their quest to modernise 
municipal government in the town. Taking control of the emergency response and 
relief effort was the immediate response, but it masked deeper-rooted tensions 
between the local state and private enterprise over the delivery of local services. An 
emerging public service ethos within Britain had started to influence how elected 
municipalities defined their rights and responsibilities. Albeit a clumsy and 
occasionally misappropriated term, “gas and water socialism” served as an ideological 
and political justification for reformist agendas, though the involvement of 
Conservatives like William Leng at the Sheffield Telegraph paints a more varied 
canvas of support for municipal trading.66 The battle to seize monopoly control of 
water supply was a turning-point in the longer-term and more pronounced 
municipalisation of the urban condition. In the case of Sheffield, public safety rhetoric 
infused public sector arguments in favour of dismantling the Company’s monopoly 
and taking ownership. Private enterprise could no longer be trusted with managing 
dangerous socio-technological systems; “focusing events” such as these proved that 
only public bodies, aided by disaster experts, enjoyed the legal and moral legitimacy 
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to safely manage such risks, which was never a given outcome of the policy learning 
process.67 Municipalisation was duly being defined as a technologically-driven 
decision as much as a political strategy, involving a complex interaction between, 
amongst other factors, ‘technological development, local politics, public financing, 
and bureaucratization.’68 
 In order to win the heated public argument about ownership, however, the 
Town Council first had to prove that the Water Company had been negligent in its 
legal duty by highlighting the engineers’ failures to safely discharge their plans. 
Consequently, the dispute relied upon technological details concerning the reservoir’s 
design, capacity and safety, and took place in a variety of arenas. Two overlapping 
enquiries occurred simultaneously: first, the public inquiry was conducted by the 
Coroner’s Court and local newspapers, and involved both expert and lay witness 
evidence; second, the professional inquiry started in the Coroner’s Court, but soon 
moved on to other institutional locations, including parliament, the town hall and the 
boardroom.69 In this inquiry, evidence was sourced from qualified engineers who 
disputed the reasons for the reservoir’s failure. Whereas the public inquiry focused 
overwhelmingly on apportioning blame for the disaster, the professional inquiry was 
more interested in addressing the causes of the failure, managing the legal 
ramifications of the Water Company’s liability, and paving the way for the eventual 
municipalisation of water. 
 The evidence on the apportioning of blame should be read with an eye on 
points-scoring by the Conservative press against the Liberal establishment, as well as 
the motives of an inexperienced, yet ambitious, Town Council. The battle-lines were 
drawn as early as the 15th March when, in a rasping editorial in the Telegraph, Leng 
declared that ‘The Bradfield Dam was a mistake, or if not a mistake we should like to 
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know what it was. It was made to perform a certain duty, and it has proved itself 
unequal to the duty.’70 Leng, a supporter of greater municipal regulation – if not 
control – of local services, regularly supplemented his editorials with articles from the 
professional press, and the voluminous correspondence from budding engineers, all of 
whom had a theory on the cause of the reservoir’s collapse.71 For instance, he praised 
an article from The Builder which criticised the engineers for failing to install sluices 
to reduce the water level, and for their use of loose and porous materials in the puddle 
wall.72 Another article, in The Engineer, agreed: ‘That the Bradfield dam was 
lamentably defective no one can doubt.’73 The Water Company had, according to 
Leng, failed to guarantee the safety of Sheffield’s residents, but the Liberal-controlled 
Town Council had also failed to adequately supervise the Company’s activities. If 
Leng was taking sides, it was with the growing Conservative influence on the Council, 
which promised stronger regulation without discouraging enterprise. On the other side, 
the Liberal Independent published similarly lengthy correspondence into the supposed 
causes of the disaster, but its editor, Robert Leader, refrained from drawing judgment 
on them until after the outcome of the Coroner’s inquiry and the report of the 
Government inspectors. Even then, he refused to condemn any aspects of the 
reservoir’s construction. Moreover, as a member of the SIRC, Leader was unwilling 
to publicly criticise his colleagues on the Council. Once the emergency relief effort 
had been organised, the flood transformed Sheffield into a battle-ground for control of 
the municipality and other important institutions, and editors like Leng and Leader 
were key players in this conflict. 
Unsurprisingly, the Coroner’s inquiry concentrated on the construction of the 
reservoir. The Water Company’s engineers were cross-examined by the Coroner, John 
Webster, and Sir Robert Rawlinson, the Home Office Inspector, both of whom 
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pounced upon any inconsistency in either man’s evidence. Both Leather and Gunson 
adhered to the Company’s official explanation for the collapse, citing a landslip, of 
‘some hundred years old,’ under the embankment, which undermined the puddle wall 
and allowed water to seep inside and force the embankment to subside. Leather 
rejected the theory that the bursting of the reservoir was through ‘unsound principles 
of engineering or … bad workmanship’, preferring to emphasise the differences 
between natural and built environments and the limits to his control over the former:  
 
I did all that I thought necessary to provide against danger. I know of no 
means of providing against danger except the pipes and bye wash … 
There is a possibility of a landslip under the seat of the embankment 
having produced it, but that I cannot tell. I do not believe the embankment 
itself has slipped, but the stratification beneath it may have slipped.74 
 
Such comments illustrate the inherent appearance of risk and uncertainty within the 
environment, and chime with the findings of Lübken, Mauch and others.75 Yet 
Leather undermined his own argument once he had admitted to having inspected both 
the puddle trench and wall once only, thereby making no concerted effort to shed light 
on the uncertain technological elements. He confessed that he had not been present at 
all during the puddling process, but had faith in Gunson adhering to his plans. Gunson 
appeared on the defensive, claiming that, having ‘acted as engineer for this company 
for nearly 33 years … there was nothing left undone that could have been done as to 
safety of construction.’76 Experience mattered to Gunson who insisted that important 
lessons would be fed back into the construction of the Company’s other dams. Try 
telling that, an irascible Webster exclaimed, to the families of those killed by ‘an 
accident that ought not to have happened and which might have been avoided.’77 
 The Water Company would not publicly admit to any mistakes. Its directors 
accepted liability, but to accept blame would be an admission to criminal damages. 
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Both engineers cited the extended excavation of the puddle-trench and the installation 
of the bye-wash as evidence that they had taken appropriate remedial safety measures; 
whilst the delays that these modifications made to the project was proof that the 
directors had put safety considerations above any pecuniary self-interest. Besides, the 
Company could handle the angry outbursts of an official, particularly after Leader, a 
supporter of the political status quo and a friend to some of the Company’s directors, 
publicly criticised Webster’s ‘intemperate language’ and ‘anti-judicious conduct.’78 
Greater difficulty was evinced by the measured condemnation of Rawlinson, 
who, as one of Britain’s leading professional engineers, was ‘listened to attentively.’ 
As an experienced servant of government – an engineering inspector for the 
disbanded General Board of Health (1848-54) and, since 1861, Chief Engineering 
Inspector in the Local Government Act Office79 – Rawlinson’s opinion mattered, 
however unpopular it could be with practicing engineers who resented government 
interference in their work. He was accompanied by Nathaniel Beardmore, an expert in 
hydraulic engineering, who was sent to represent the ICE in the absence of its 
President, John Hawkshaw.80 Rawlinson and Beardmore made ‘a full and searching 
examination’ of the ruined reservoir, as well as the Company’s other works, studied 
the original plans, and attended meetings of the Water-Works Committee and the 
SIRC. No stone would be left unturned in their pursuit of the truth.81  
Rawlinson lent the weight of detached expert evidence to the proceedings, 
identifying ‘Several grave errors … in designing and in executing these works.’ First, 
he insisted that pipes should not have been laid unsupported through the ‘dangerous’ 
puddle-trench. These he suspected had slipped into the artificially formed substratum 
in the trench, leaving a cavity above it for water to seep through, further adding that 
the absence of valves to turn the water off from the pipes was ‘a fatal objection’.82 
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Second, having inspected the Agden construction site, which was modelled on the 
DDR plans, he criticised the mode of unsystematically tipping wagon-loads of rocks, 
stones and other materials to build up the embankment as dangerous, rendering it ‘as 
porous as a sieve.’83 In their haste to exploit the natural environment for their 
directors’ benefits, the engineers had under-estimated the ways in which nature 
constrained their best efforts to create a safe technology, thereby erecting an ‘illusory 
boundary’ between technology and the environment that was misguided at best.84 By 
cutting corners on safety, Rawlinson insisted, Leather had failed in his basic duty: 
‘The engineer should be master of his work; not let it be master of him.’85 
Uncertainties and in-built risks could, with care and responsibility, be rendered 
knowable and controllable. 
Rawlinson’s evidence went some way towards alleviating the public’s 
insatiable appetite for explanations. In so doing, his testimony added considerable 
weight to the jury’s decision that ‘there has not been that engineering skill and 
attention in the construction of the works, which their magnitude and importance 
demanded.’86 He and Beardmore repeated these criticisms in their joint report to the 
Home Secretary.87 The problem, therefore, lay with the reservoir’s original design and 
construction; mistakes had subsequently been made by the Resident Engineer, under 
pressure from the directors to complete on time, in the absence of adequate 
supervision from the Consulting Engineer.88 
Rawlinson’s evidence might have assuaged public anxieties, but, as one 
engineering writer put it, he ‘is not an authority above all others in matters of 
engineering.’89  The idea that there can be dispassionate and neutral scientific inquiry 
into the key questions of causality and blame is misleading. A discourse of public 
responsibility for the safety of private ventures had evolved during the nineteenth-
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century to the point that there existed a dense network of investigators each 
representing conflicting interests and tending to emphasize different aspects of the 
same disaster, which inevitably made it impossible to assign blame.90 More generally 
still, competing discourses of nature and risk emerged through which an 
understanding of “socionature” could be constructed, represented and challenged in a 
variety of engineering, scientific and political contexts.91 
The engineering profession was divided over the likely cause of the accident 
and the Water Company’s directors deftly exploited this split. Timed to coincide with 
Rawlinson and Beardmore’s report, though subsequently delayed, the directors 
commissioned their own inquiry and hired ‘the undoubted leaders of the profession 
amongst Hydraulic Engineers in England’ to conduct it.92 In addition to Simpson and 
Bateman, these included Thomas Hawksley, another celebrated water engineer and a 
member of the ICE’s Council since 1853, who had designed a constant water supply 
for Nottingham, and had recently completed reservoirs for Liverpool and Leicester. 
John Fowler, a former pupil of Leather at Sheffield and the chief engineer to the 
Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway, was a natural ally for the Company; 
T.E. Harrison, who was most intimately known for his work on the North Eastern 
Railway, but also had an active interest in water engineering, completed the team.93 
In their jointly authored report, issued in November 1864, they picked apart 
each of Rawlinson and Beardmore’s points. They were satisfied that the puddle-trench 
had been sunk to a sufficient depth to make it water-tight and stated that the 
embankment was made from the ‘best material which could be procured,’ that is, of 
material excavated from within the reservoir itself. The discharge pipes had been 
carefully laid in a trench specially cut out from the solid ground beneath the base of 
the bank, made watertight with lead and protected by a layer of ‘good puddled clay 
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well rammed together.’ By deliberately reducing the capacity of the reservoir from 
their original plans, and increasing the size of the embankment, the Company’s 
engineers had paid due attention to public safety and ‘determined to avoid’ any 
dangers. This led them to conclude that the accident was caused neither by 
engineering or design fault, but by a landslip, ‘which occurred in the ground 
immediately on the east side of the embankment, and which extended beneath a 
portion of its outer slope, involving in its consequences the ruin of that portion of the 
bank, and producing the catastrophe which followed.’ The physical evidence of the 
surrounding landscape – with its tears and fractures signifying land movement – was 
enough for the engineers to absolve Leather and Gunson from any blame.94 
Aware of delays facing the Company’s inquiry, the Council’s Waterworks 
Committee out-maneuvered the directors for once by commissioning its own report 
into the cause of the collapse, which it published in June. Unsurprisingly, it included 
all those reports from qualified engineers, nine in total, which found fault with either 
the construction or management of the waterworks and favoured public ownership of 
waterworks. These included the water engineers James Leslie, Chief Engineer to 
Edinburgh Waterworks, Henry Conybeare, who designed Bombay’s waterworks, and 
David Stevenson, well-known for his works in canal and river engineering, as well as 
the celebrated railway engineers Sir John Rennie, Charles Blacker Vignoles, John 
Murray and Peter William Barlow.95 Much of what they wrote chimed with 
Rawlinson’s criticisms. For example, Leslie, the pioneer of embankment-style storage 
reservoirs in non-urban settings, found the decision to build one in an area susceptible 
to slippage ‘in the highest degree objectionable,’ and, along with Barlow, blamed the 
lack of ‘sufficient and careful supervision’ for its collapse. Conybeare cited poor 
decision-making throughout as the main defect: this included Leather’s decision to 
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site the dam on ‘a line of fault abounding in springs’; the use of pervious materials, 
unevenly spread, in the embankment, which duly settled and sank ‘to a level 
dangerously near that of the water’; the ‘injudiciously thin’ puddle trench, deemed too 
small for such a large reservoir; and inadequate provision of inlet and outlet pipes, 
goits and channels for regulating the flow of water through the reservoir.96 
Others, like Rennie, a former ICE President (1845-48), and William Lee, the 
sanitary engineer, preferred to suggest solutions, identifying municipalisation as the 
logical option facing the town: 
 
Considering the size of Sheffield, its growing importance, the general 
tendency of legislation on the subject, and the reciprocal connection 
between water supplies and drainage and other sanitary arrangements, it is 
my opinion that the Corporation ought to have possession of the water 
works.97 
 
Vignoles further fuelled the acrimony by deriding the Company for destroying public 
confidence in the private management of large engineering works and claiming that it 
would simply ‘go on repeating the dangerous practises’ if left in charge.98 Taken by 
surprise by the Council’s spirited activities and strongly-worded condemnation, the 
Company’s directors tried to dismiss the report as speculative scaremongering, seeing 
the exercise as a calculated attempt by the Council to seize control of its property, 
occurring as it did against a backdrop of recriminatory negotiations to settle the 
compensation rights of victims. 
Apart from the fact that each engineer was commissioned to comment on the 
DDR’s collapse by a partisan body, the reasons for the division in opinion appeared to 
boil down to personal loyalties (between Fowler and Leather, or Leslie and Rennie, 
who were Edinburgh friends, for example), professional rivalries, especially between 
Bateman, Hawksley and Rawlinson, and personal preferences for public or private 
28 
ownership: Hawksley was a staunch advocate of private water supplies, believing that 
the provision of constant water supplies could only be satisfactorily delivered through 
competition, whereas Leslie favoured municipal control, not least because of the 
checks it brought against unnecessary expansionism. Whereas Bateman had worked 
for the municipal authorities in Manchester and Glasgow, many of his commissions 
came from private enterprises, so he was unlikely to publicly condemn a major source 
of income. Lee, who had been paid by Sheffield Town Council in 1847 to report on 
the sanitary condition of the town, was likewise a safe pair of hands for the municipal 
cause. Moreover, despite the divisions on this issue, there were no noted institutional 
splits within the ICE’s membership: all the engineers involved in the dispute were 
long-time members, and some, like Simpson, Fowler, Rennie and Vignoles, enjoyed 
senior positions. Nor was there any obvious disagreement between the ICE and IME. 
Indeed some, notably Hawksley, Fowler and Leather, were members of both bodies.99  
The inconclusiveness of either side’s evidence meant that neither inquiry 
settled the issue of blame. Yet the political ramifications to the engineering impasse 
were considerable, not least with the Water Company’s defiant response. Having 
admitted liability for the accident, its annual report outlined plans to promote a Bill to 
raise £400,000, ‘to meet all the claims arising out of the late lamentable occurrence,’ 
and to create an ‘independent’ Commission to administer them. To offset the 
additional burden on its shareholders, the directors further proposed to make ‘a 
moderate addition’ to their water rates. Any defense of the Company’s reasonable 
claims were duly shattered by the revelation in the published Bill that the directors 
brazenly advocated a twenty-five per-cent hike in their rates in perpetuity; they were, 
in effect, charging the town’s residents for their negligence.100 
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 Amidst the inevitable outrage of public meetings and press censuring, the 
Council opposed the Bill and offered to purchase the Company’s concern. Called to 
debate the finer points before select committees of both Houses of Parliament, the 
opponents readied themselves to prove that the disaster had been caused by bad 
engineering, but were headed off by the Company’s admission of liability. This meant 
that the Bill was debated on legal points alone, playing into the hands of the 
Company’s expert legal team, which could boast of the support of Sheffield’s large 
ratepayers. Neither of Sheffield’s Members of Parliament, one of whom was a major 
shareholder in the Company, spoke against the Bill. Both committees unsurprisingly 
found in favour of the Bill, although the Lords fixed the rate increase to twenty-five 
years and ordered the Company to give a constant supply to the town within five 
years and complete its Loxley works by 1873.101 Defeated and demoralised, the Town 
Council was railed against publicly for its inept showing, undermining all the effort it 
had invested into winning the argument in favour of municipalisation. By focusing 
exclusively on engineering issues, the Council had failed to whet the public and media 
appetite for reform, which had centered on political and moral arguments against 
private enterprise rather than the technological details. They had also lost the 
momentum provided by Leng’s open criticism of the Water Company. The window of 
opportunity, which is always briefly open following “focusing events,” had thus 
closed; the political momentum generated by the disaster had been insufficiently 
seized.102 As this case had proven, engineering arguments only went so far in the 
heated debates over municipalisation. 
The passing of the Sheffield (Bradfield Inundation) Act was not the final 
curtain to the saga. Three Inundation Commissioners were appointed, who, between 
October 1864 and April 1865, sat in judgment of 6,619 claims for destroyed or 
30 
damaged property as well as the claims for deaths and injuries. Claimants ranged from 
the largest manufacturers in Sheffield’s steel and iron industries to individual cutlers 
and grinders who claimed against loss of employment. They also included 
shopkeepers, farmers, timber merchants, brickmakers and printers, as well as many 
hundreds of domestic claims for loss of furniture and household effects. The 
Commissioners’ proceedings meticulously record the priorities of victims who were 
trying to rebuild their lives, emphasising the calculability of material losses over the 
human casualties, and illustrating the Water Company’s hand over the settlement 
procedure.103 The final sum of £276,821 awarded was a welcome figure for the 
Company, which invested the remainder raised under its Act into its works.104 
Tensions between the Council and the Company simmered for the next 
twenty-five years, boiling over on occasions when the former again tried to take-over 
the waterworks. Whenever the two bodies clashed, the memory of Dale Dyke was 
invoked and old wounds reopened. After the Company defaulted on its obligation to 
provide a constant supply in 1869, Sheffield’s Mayor brought the disaster up in his 
written complaints to the Home Office and the Board of Trade.105 This simmering 
hostility culminated when, once the Company’s rating agreement came up for renewal 
in 1887, the Council finally succeeded in taking control of the town’s water supply. 
Time was a great healer of wounds. None of the directors in 1887 had been on the 
board in 1864, as also with the Council. Upon its purchase, all the Company’s works 
were transferred under municipal control, including the reconstructed DDR, which 
was completed in 1875 one-quarter of a mile higher up the valley from the original 
site.106 The Council proceeded to complete the projected Loxley works under the 
supervision of the Company’s Resident Engineer, Michael Edward Eaton, who 
succeeded Gunson on his death in 1886, and its Consulting Engineer, Thomas 
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Hawksley, who replaced Leather in 1865 as the inevitable collateral damage after the 
flood. Together, they finished Damflask Reservoir by sinking a concrete and puddle 
wing trench as an additional safety measure. Public safety tended to follow municipal 
control because town councils could fall back on their rates as collateral against the 
extra capital investment. In his report on the works’ completion, the Chairman of 
Sheffield’s Waterworks Committee diplomatically marked the occasion: ‘we are at 
the completion of the extensive scheme of Rivelin and Loxley Waterworks, as system, 
not only of magnitude…, but one which, for its engineering features, and from the 
memory which attaches to the Dale Dyke disaster of 1864, is among the most 
interesting in the country.’ There was no opening ceremony; memories of the disaster 
had not yet sufficiently abated.107 
 
Conclusion 
Having taken twenty-five years to secure control of the waterworks, it would be easy 
to conclude that the Sheffield Town Council failed to capitalize on the window of 
opportunity temporarily opened by the flood of 1864, but this would mask significant 
historical context. Urban environmental historians have argued that floods and other 
“nature-induced disasters” act as catalysts for major social and political change: major 
fires and earthquakes have triggered significant changes to building regulations, 
insurance codes as well as fire-fighting and other emergency relief services; floods 
similarly cause fundamental shifts in flood prevention and risk management policy, 
not least with building-in additional capacity for overflow in reservoirs or in installing 
sea defences for combating coastal floods.108 There also remains a society-wide 
tendency to believe that, in order to be effective, change needs to be immediate 
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because, as Frank Uekötter writes, ‘A natural disaster is like a bee. It stings, and then 
dies,’ presumably to be forgotten by legislators, relief agencies and others.109 
Such a view understates the longer-term, more piecemeal influence of 
disasters, particularly in the case of “engineering-induced” incidents. Such events can 
trigger a strengthening of regulatory control and supervision, particularly from the 
state: much fire safety legislation in Britain, for example, has been passed in the 
aftermath of major fires. Yet the majority of these changes – to political structures, 
social attitudes and technological systems – originated locally and followed years of 
piecemeal innovation at the municipal level.110 A disaster may, like a bee, sting and 
then die, but it is never forgotten; it can leave a scar that long continues to haunt and 
shape a community’s identity, memory and collective attitude towards reform. 
The localness of Sheffield’s flood limited its wider social and political 
reverberations, especially since the flood occurred during a time when the central 
government remained wedded to the philosophy of laissez-faire. Such policy 
windows are hardly unimportant when restricted to the local stage, however, because 
much of the agitation for the municipalisation of water, gas and other utilities came 
from the local level and reflected a growing trend for municipal control across the 
urban-industrial north and midlands. Historians have long agreed that the 
transformation of Victorian municipal government was achieved primarily by local 
legislation promoted by local councils and fostered by local pride.111 In the case of 
municipal water supplies, over 130 town councils established a presence in the two 
decades after 1866; in the two decades before 1865 only fifty-one councils did 
likewise.112 Although it is unclear how much incidents such as the Sheffield and 
Holmfirth floods influenced this changed ethos, the Sheffield Town Council’s relative 
immaturity as a regulatory body was evidently not uncommon; neither was the Water 
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Company’s strength to maintain monopoly control in the face of fierce public censure. 
The Council’s representatives obviously lacked the financial, engineering and legal 
resources necessary to win its argument with the Company’s directors and engineers. 
Yet the political, engineering and legal discourses that were riven with fierce 
recriminations for both sides invested the Council’s officials with crucial experience 
from which they were able to exert greater regulatory and supervisory control over the 
Company’s works, before inevitably securing ownership in 1887. Municipal 
intervention in the supply of water was less, as John Hassan has shown, an ideological 
response to perceived market failures than ‘a pragmatic and rather haphazard process’ 
involving a variety of local factors; the Sheffield case proves this.113 
This paper has also revealed the tensions within the contemporary engineering 
profession over the alleged causes of technological failure. Whereas some sections of 
the profession effectively closed rank around troubled engineers, others publicly 
doubted their ability and questioned the nature of professional practice. Everyone 
connected with the design, management and use of water supply technologies was 
invested in the cult of engineering innovation, yet responsibility ultimately rested with 
the appointed engineers, who derived their power from their specialised knowledge 
and experience, and answered to this in a variety of public and private arenas. 
Engineering expertise was, therefore, socially and politically constructed through the 
working relations forged between consultant engineers, their employers and critics, 
and was strongly shaped by the contemporary debates over the politics of supply 
between private water suppliers, their customers and municipal regulators.  
Conflicting explanations mattered where non-expert bodies could harness the 
available evidence and arguments to suit their own pre-determined agendas. Boards of 
directors for water companies and the waterworks committees of elected municipal 
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government exploited this engineering impasse, thereby rendering some of the 
country’s leading engineers as pawns in a political game over control of water 
supplies. Yet for all the infighting, no consensus was ever reached regarding the 
supposed cause of the Dale Dyke Reservoir’s collapse. By resorting to cumbersome 
arguments that centered on unverifiable technical details, these bodies distanced 
themselves from the broader public debates about the ownership, delivery and pricing 
of water. Lay debates, generally the preserve of the contemporary press, tended to 
focus on moral and ideological arguments that favoured municipalisation, whereas the 
leaders of Sheffield Town Council allowed themselves to be pulled into a convoluted 
technical and legalistic debate that they had little chance of winning against the 
Sheffield Water-Works Company, well endowed as it was with financial, legal and 
political clout. 
All this occurred against the backdrop of an emerging public discourse that 
broadly favoured the municipalisation of water supplies on grounds of public health 
and cost, and which undoubtedly influenced some engineers’ criticisms of the 
methods employed by privately-contracted engineers. Municipal authorities were 
keen to utilize the detached support of professional engineers in their arsenal of 
arguments in favour of wrestling control of waterworks from private enterprise. 
Similarly, some engineers, conscious of the threat to their livelihoods by a 
diminishing number of outlets for contracted work, vocally defended competition in 
supply. Although historians have tended to focus on more general arguments for 
municipalisation around themes like public health, social justice and the heavy cost of 
providing universal access to water, technological, environmental and engineering 
factors also need to be considered. In particular, historians are beginning to consider 
the ways in which engineers’ projects facilitated greater integration and overlap 
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between natural and manmade environments, thereby extending a town’s hinterland 
beyond the suburban fringe. It suited the longer-term goals of ambitious municipal 
governments to own such ventures since municipalisation paved the way for the 
inevitable extension of the network as well as the town’s legal and fiscal borders. 
Thus, in 1896 Sheffield Council was given authority to extend its waterworks into the 
Little Don Valley and become a water supplier for the neighbouring South Yorkshire 
towns of Doncaster and Rotherham, and three years later it entered into an agreement 
with the authorities of Derby, Leicester and Nottingham to share the upland drainage 
waters of the Derwent Valley.114 
Finally, the Sheffield flood occurred within a specific socio-political moment 
in the town’s history. As a rapidly growing industrial town faced with a burgeoning 
water-supply problem, Sheffield, much like other industrial towns, was governed by 
an elite that was under pressure to make the transition into a modern form of 
municipal government. The contested nature in which Sheffield’s flood was reported 
testifies to the contestations prevalent within the town’s contemporary governance. 
Critics like William Leng, the newspaper editor, capitalised on the destructive 
prowess of the flood waters by attacking the existing Liberal elite that made up a 
significant proportion of Sheffield’s governing classes, effectively using the flood as 
an opportunity to make political capital. In addition, the Water Company’s directors 
also capitalised on the flood to tighten their grip over the town’s supply in the face of 
an emerging municipal threat in the post-flood arena, deftly exploiting Parliament’s 
proclivity to allow private enterprise to regulate itself. More widely still, professional 
knowledge about the safety of urban waterworks was produced, consumed and 
challenged in a variety of public arenas, at both the local and national scales. This 
brought the organisations that managed urban society into conflict with one another, 
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broke down existing coalitions of public and private interests, not least between the 
Water Company and Town Council, and opened up new vistas from which industrial 
towns would be governed in future. 
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